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I. INTRODUCTION
Prisoners often seek redress in federal courts through causes
of action brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 19831 for violations of
their constitutional rights caused by the overall condition of their
confinement2 or by one specific condition3 or incident.4 Although
* Instructor in Clinical Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A., Williams; J.D.,
Vanderbilt. The author wishes to thank Julie Genovese and Brenda G. Siniard for their
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ...
2. E.g., Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), af'd, 548 F.2d 740 (8th
Cir. 1977), afI'd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
3. E.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (inmates' right of access to the courts
includes access to a law library); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (asserting right of non-
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commentators disagree over the extent to which these cases burden
federal district courts,5 they agree that prisoner litigation consti-
tutes a large percentage of the civil rights litigation in district
courts. One of the attractions of prison privatization for state and
local governments is the belief that contracting prison manage-
ment to private firms will relieve the government of the burden of
defending the multitude of individual and class-wide civil rights
actions and the expense of complying with comprehensive and
often financially burdensome court orders.'
Several reasons may explain the inmates' choice to litigate
constitutional claims in federal court rather than litigating them as
tort actions in state court, but two reasons predominate. First,
most state legislatures have immunized state officials from suit in
state court for actions arising from their official conduct.' Inmates
either have no recourse in state court9 or are forced to proceed in a
manner other than a trial before a jury.10 Second, and possibly
even more important, prisoners perceive that federal courts possess
Christian inmates to hold religious services in prison chapel); Shabbaz v. Barnauskas, 790
F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.) (challenging, on grounds of the first amendment right to religious
freedom, requirement that inmate shave his beard), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 655 (1986);
Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1986) (challenging, on first amendment religious
freedom grounds, state officials' refusal to allow inmate to use soap that did not contain
pork products); Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971) (challenging conditions of soli-
tary confinement), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972); accord Love v. Summitt County, 776
F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986); Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337
(4th Cir. 1985).
4. E.g., Albers v. Whitley, 546 F. Supp. 726 (D. Or. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
743 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
5. Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (compare footnote 212: Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District of Illinois, 6 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 527 (1975); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits
in Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610 (1979) with footnote 168: Lewis v. County of Le-
high, 516 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Sloan v. Southampton Correctional Center,
476 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Va. 1979); Comment, State Courts and Federalism in the
1980's, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 821, 822 (1981)).
6. Eisenberg, supra note 5.
7. See generally Cody & Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional Institutions: The
Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REv. 829 (1987).
8. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8521-8522 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1987) (providing
sovereign immunity unless conduct falls within eight narrow exceptions); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWs ANN. §§ 21-32A-2 to -3 (Supp. 1986) (immunizing employees, officers, and agents from
suit, except insofar as insurance is provided).
9. E.g., ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 14 (providing that the State shall never be made a defend-
ant in any court of law or equity); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10() (1986) (explicitly excepting
prisoners' suits from waiver of sovereign immunity).
10. E.g., LA_ REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1171 to :1176 (West Supp. 1987) (requiring exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies).
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an aura of justice and dignity that they find lacking in state
courts.11 Because of this fascination with federal court, there is
every reason to expect that if private contractors operate state or
local correctional facilities, prisoners will continue to seek redress
in federal court through Section 1983, despite an enhanced ability
to bring a state court action against a prison operator occasioned
by diminished immunity for a private contractor. 2
Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish: (1) that he or she
was deprived of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States; 3 and 2) that the deprivation arose
under color of state law." This Article will focus on the conse-
quences of the entrance of private contractors as defendants in
prisoner litigation under Section 1983. More specifically, the topics
covered are the issues surrounding state action, sovereign immu-
nity, and qualified immunity. Although the impact of these issues
on cases brought against private contractors in the state prison
systems is the major consideration, this Article discusses the points
at which the implications would be different if the public con-
tracting authority were a municipality. 5
II. THE PRIVATE CONTRACTOR AS STATE ACTOR
16
Section 1983 applies only to constitutional violations by per-
sons "acting under color of state law." The only conduct actionable
under the fourteenth amendment is "state action." The Supreme
Court has held that, for most purposes, action under color of state
law is coextensive with conduct that constitutes state action. 7 This
11. Quite possibly, this fascination with federal courts flows from the fact that the
inmates were convicted in state court and therefore find the procedures and results in that
forum to be inadequate.
12. For example, Tennessee law denies the private contractor any sovereign immunity
defenses. 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 932, § 7(b). Although other states have not legislated di-
rectly, common-law notions of sovereign immunity would not extend necessarily to a private
contractor performing a service for the government. See infra notes 65-74 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of the immunity defenses available to private contractors.
13. The substantive claims that prisoners in private facilities might raise and the dif-
ference between these claims and the claims of prisoners in public facilities will not be dis-
cussed in this Article.
14. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
15. For example, one municipality, Hamilton County, Tennessee, has contracted with
Corrections Corporation of America to operate the workhouse in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
See Press, "A Person, Not a Number," NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1987, at 63.
16. For purposes of this section of the analysis, whether the § 1983 plaintiff sues a
private company or one of its employees is of no legal significance.
17. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982). Although grammati-
cally speaking, the phrase "under color of state law," appears more encompassing than
1987]
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analysis merges, at least in part, the findings necessary to sustain a
claim under the fourteenth amendment with the jurisdictional pre-
requisite to a claim under Section 1983.18
The Court's most complete reassessment of the state action/
under color of state law requirement occurred on June 25, 1982
when the Court decided Lugar v. Edmondson Oil,19 Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn,20 and Blum v. Yaretsky.2' In these three cases, the Court
considered several alternative tests for determining whether a pri-
vate party's conduct can convert the private actor into a state ac-
tor for purposes of Section 1983 liability. In Rendell-Baker and
Blum the Court examined whether the government regulated or
funded the activity; whether a symbiotic relationship or mutual in-
terdependence existed between the government and the private ac-
tor; and, finally, whether the private actor performed a state func-
tion.2 More commonly, these factors have been collapsed into
three tests: 23 the symbiosis test, the nexus test, and the public
"state action," they are derived from the same source-the fourteenth amendment. The due
process clause renders unconstitutional only conduct that is attributable to the state. Sec-
tion 1983 was enacted under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which gives Congress the
power to enforce the due process clause. It would be ironic if conduct were actionable under
the enforcement clause, but not unconstitutional under the amendment itself.
18. But cf. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk County, the Court
held that a public defender-state employee-was not acting under color of state law when
she represented indigent criminal defendants. The Court grounded its holding in Polk
County on the relationship between the public defender, her client, and the state. Although
paid by the state, the public defender is the client's advocate and is charged specifically
with being the adversary of the very state that pays his or her salary. Thus, in representing
the client, the public defender is not acting on behalf of the state. Polk County left unan-
swered the question whether a public defender is a state actor when he or she performs
other functions, e.g., hiring and firing assistant public defenders.
19. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
20. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
21. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). For a discussion of these three cases, see Note, Tower of Ba-
bel Revisited: State Action and the 1982 Supreme Court, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 305 (1982).
22. These factors first were utilized by the Court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,
419 U.S. 345 (1974), in which Justice Douglas criticized severely the seriatim approach to
the state action/under color of state law analysis. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
keeping with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), Justice Douglas
argued, the test must assess the facts in total: "As our subsequent discussion in Burton
made clear, the dispositive question in any state-action case is not whether any single fact or
relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involvement, but rather whether the aggre-
gate of all relevant factors compels a finding of state responsibility." Jackson, 419 U.S. at
360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Burton, 365 U.S. at 722-26. Justice Douglas continued,
stating: "It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors upon which a claimant
relies and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding of state
action. It is the aggregate that is controlling." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
23. In addition to finding one of these alternative prerequisites, the Court in Lugar
870
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function test.2 4
A. The Symbiosis Test
In analyzing whether a private actor enjoys a symbiotic rela-
tionship-one of mutual interdependence-with the state, the
Court continues to pay lip service to the broad definition of symbi-
osis articulated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.2 5 In
Burton the plaintiff claimed that a privately owned restaurant's
practice of refusing to serve blacks violated the fourteenth amend-
ment. The restaurant was located in a municipal parking garage.
Although the diner did not open into the garage, the Court found
that its location and financial arrangement with the city created a
situation of mutual interdependence, thus making the restaurant a
suggested a first prong which must be met even prior to determining the existence of symbi-
osis, nexus, or public function:
Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation
of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. These cases reflect a two-part
approach to this question of "fair attribution." First, the deprivation must be caused
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible. In Sniadach,
Fuentes, W.T. Grant, and North Georgia, for example, a state statute provided the
right to garnish or to obtain prejudgment attachment, as well as the procedure by
which the rights could be exercised. Second, the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is
a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from
state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. Without a
limit such as this, private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they
seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community sur-
rounding them.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. The decisions in Rendell-Baker and Blum, issued on the same day,
never discuss their first prong. For further discussion of this Lugar analysis, see infra note
55 and accompanying text.
24. An additional theory finds state action when private parties act in concert or con-
spire with state officials to violate constitutional rights. This theory was referred to as joint
participation. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); see also Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). This theory has not been discussed separately because, for the
most part, the symbiosis test has subsumed much of joint participation. Indeed, the Burton
Court itself referred to symbiosis as joint participation. See infra note 25. This theory still
might apply, however, in cases in which a contractor performed functions in conjunction
with the state. For example, where a contractor provided the guards under the supervision
of a state employed shift supervisor. If the supervisor and guard together violated rights, a
court might find them to be joint participants. The less involvement the state has in the
day-to-day operations, however, the less likely a court would be to find joint participation.
25. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). As the Court defined it, symbiosis occurs when "[tlhe State
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private actor] that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 725.
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state actor, subject to suit for constitutional deprivations. Subse-
quently, however, the Court has narrowed the fact patterns that
will satisfy the Burton symbiosis standard. Indeed, since the
Court decided Burton, it has not found symbiosis to exist in any
other case. 7
Despite the Court's reluctance to find a symbiotic relationship,
privatizing a correctional facility might create such a relationship
even under the Court's narrow definition. As the Court stated in
Burton, the symbiosis analysis is fact based.2 In the case of pri-
vate prisons, a reviewing court should consider the financial ar-
rangement between the state and the private contractor, whether
the private contractor owned the prisons or leased them from the
state, and the extent to which the state supervised the contractor
in the everyday operation of the facility. Obviously, the more par-
ticularized the state's supervision or regulation, the more likely a
court would find state action under this theory. In addition, the
very fact that the state statute vests custody of persons in the state
26. There may be historical justification for this constriction of the test. Burton was a
racial discrimination case decided before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been passed.
Thus, the only way to find unlawful the apparently private discrimination by persons pro-
viding public accommodation in Burton was to establish that the conduct was state action
and thus litigable under § 1983. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Once Congress
passed the 1964 Act under the aegis of the commerce clause, the need no longer existed to
find state action in Burton-type situations since the conduct was presumptively actionable
under the new statute. In addition, racial discrimination, like that evidenced in Burton, was
exactly the type of evil Congress intended § 1983 to remedy. Following the philosophy of
Burton, the Second Circuit has created a separate, less stringent test for state action in
racial discrimination cases. See, e.g., Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D. Conn.
1979), citing Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Grafton v. Brook-
lyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1973).
27. In Perez v Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit found that a
symbiotic relationship existed between the State of New York and private agencies which
provided foster care to children who were in the state's custody. The factors pertinent to
this holding were: (1) the existence of a statute that made the state responsible for the care
of all children in need of assistance; (2) the pervasiveness of the state's control over the
operation of the private agency, including mandatory visitation, inspection and supervision;
(3) the detailed records that the private agency must provide to the state; and (4) the state's
ability to remove the children from the institution at any time. The court stated:
This comprehensive statute thus establishes that while the State may have yielded
physical possession of the children, at no time did it, or indeed could it, relinquish
effective legal control over them .... [T]hese private entities are an integral part of the
public operation of providing assistance. And, as the Supreme Court has pointed out in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, .. . the dependence of the State on private
parties is a factor which tends to establish the intimacy requisite to a finding of "state
action."
Id. at 766.
28. 365 U.S. at 722 ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonob-
vious involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed its true significance.").
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provides a strong indication of symbiosis.29
B. The Nexus Test
Under the nexus test, a court would look to the same facts
considered under the symbiosis test, but would focus "on [the]
state involvement in the challenged activity itself," rather than "on
the overall relationship between the state and the private entity."30
In deciding whether the private contractor's conduct is state ac-
tion, the court would look to specific state regulations and statutes
to see how severely they limit the private contractor's discretion.
Under this theory, the state effectively could shield the private
contractor from civil rights liability by giving the contractor little
statutory or regulatory guidance in its role as custodian of the pris-
oners. By limiting its regulation of the contractor, however, the
state might increase its own liability on the theory that it did not
comply sufficiently with its responsibility to assure the proper care
of the prisoners placed in its custody.31
In addition, under the nexus theory of state action, certain as-
pects of a private contractor's conduct could constitute state ac-
tion, while other aspects could be deemed purely private. For ex-
ample, if a state had legislated in the area of prison conditions but
did not regulate the private contractor's relationship with its em-
ployees, Section 1983 would provide a cause of action for an in-
mate, but not an employee, aggrieved by the private party's uncon-
stitutional treatment.
29. Perez, 499 F. Supp. at 766.
30. Martin v. Delaware Law School, 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1301 (D. Del. 1985). This re-
quirement of state involvement for the nexus test is derived from Blum and Jackson:
First, although it is apparent that nursing homes in New York are extensively regu-
lated, "[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself
convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The complaining party must also show that "there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." The purpose of this requirement
is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the
state is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. The im-
portance of this assurance is evident when, as in this case, the complaining party seeks
to hold the State liable for the actions of private parties.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis in original), quoting Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 351 (1974).
31. Since the statute gives custody to the state, the state would have a duty to ensure
that the prisoners were treated in a constitutional manner. Arguably, the state may have a
nondelegable duty to ensure the proper treatment of prisoners, thereby making the state
liable any time a prisoner-in whoever's custody-is treated unconstitutionally. This duty
has not yet been addressed by any court.
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In Milonas v. Williams, 2 for example, two students alleged
that a private school violated their eighth amendment rights.
Provo Canyon School for Boys was a private facility established to
educate boys who required a restricted, therapeutic environment.
The students claimed that the school's excessive use of behavior
modification techniques and the school's treatment of its students
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
The district court found the requisite state action based on its
determination that the school was, in effect, a detention facility
subject to significant funding and regulation by the state. The
school restricted the students to the grounds and hunted the stu-
dents down and returned them to custody if they left. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding of state action. The appel-
late court's analysis, through inartful juxtaposition of terms,
seemed to combine a symbiosis/joint participation analysis with
the nexus test. Citing Burton, the court found that the state had
"so insinuated itself with the Provo Canyon School as to be consid-
ered a joint participant in the offending actions."33 The evidence of
this relationship included detailed contracts between the school
and the local school districts that placed boys at Provo Canyon,
significant state funding of the institution, extensive regulation of
the school, and the juvenile court's practice of committing boys to
the school often with the consent of the boy's parents. The court
concluded: "These facts demonstrate that there was a sufficiently
close nexus between the states sending boys to the school and the
conduct of the school authorities so as to support a claim under
Section 1983. ' '3.
While recognizing that under Rendell-Baker35 these facts did
not appear to support a finding of state action, the court, nonethe-
less, distinguished Milonas' fact situation from Rendell-Baker's, in
which the plaintiffs claimed that the private school fired them
without procedural due process and for constitutionally impermis-
sible reasons. In Rendell-Baker the Supreme Court found that the
State of Massachusetts had very little involvement in the employ-
ment decisions of the private school. 6 In Milonas, by contrast, the
plaintiffs complained of the very activity that the state regulated
heavily. Thus, despite its apparent espousal of both the symbiosis
32. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 940.
34. Id.
35. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
36. Id. at 841.
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and nexus tests, the court, in effect, resolved the issue based solely
on the nexus test because the court emphasized the connection be-
tween the specific conduct at issue and the state's regulation .3
C. The Public Function Test
Private contractors are most likely to be held accountable
under Section 1983 by application of the public function doctrine.
As articulated in Rendell-Baker, the doctrine allows a private en-
tity to be deemed a state actor if it performs a function that "has
been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' "38 In
Rendell-Baker the Supreme Court held that, although tradition-
ally a function of the state, education had never been an exclusive
public function."
Involuntary detention, conversely, traditionally has been con-
sidered an exclusive state function. The issue has arisen specifi-
cally in the context of the decision to commit a mentally ill person.
Because of the prevalence of private psychiatric hospitals and non-
state employed psychiatrists who are authorized to participate in
the commitment process, several courts have had the opportunity
to review the character of these parties' actions.
Although courts differ as to when the physician's action carries
the compulsion of detention and thus becomes state action, they
have been fairly uniform in finding that a mere recommendation to
send a person to a mental institution for evaluation is not state
action. This recommendation may be evidenced by the physician
signing a certificate requiring the person to be evaluated. 0 Recom-
mending commitment is not uniquely a public function; both pri-
vate individuals and the state have the power to make this recom-
mendation. Family members and friends, as well as physicians or
state employees, can file a certificate or other paper requesting
37. The court's confusion is understandable because the same facts may give rise to an
inference of both symbiosis and nexus. The key difference, as articulated in Martin v. Dela-
ware Law School, 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1301 (D. Del. 1985), is the state's force behind the
particular decision or action that is the crux of the lawsuit.
38. 457 U.S. at 842, quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011 (emphasis in original).
39. Activities that courts have found to be public functions include: operation of a
park, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); process serving, see United States v. Wise-
man, 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1971); and care of foster children, see Perez v Sugarman, 499
F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. See, e.g., Willacy v. Lewis, 598 F. Supp. 346 (D. D.C. 1984), citing Byrne v. Kysar,
347 F.2d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1965); Landry v. Odom, 559 F. Supp. 514, 517-18 (E.D. La. 1983);
Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Green v. Truman, 459 F. Supp.
342, 344 (D. Mass. 1978); Orlando v. Wizel, 443 F. Supp. 744, 751 (W.D. Ark. 1978).
1987] 875
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that a person be transported to a psychiatric facility for evaluation.
The moment that this recommendation transforms into detention
is determined by state statutes and the procedures followed in any
particular jurisdiction. State action is present when the state gives
a private actor the legal authority to detain a person against his or
her will. 41 In some states this transfer of legal authority may occur
when the physician or private hospital has authority to detain the
person for a lengthy evaluation; in other states it may not occur
until a hospital formally commits a person for an indefinite period
of time. The overarching theme, however, is that detention of a
person against his or her will is essentially and traditionally within
the exclusive power of the state.42
The only court to address the issue of the private contractor's
role as detainer of inmates held that the company was a state actor
because it provided a public function. In Medina v. O'Neill43 Chief
Judge Singleton of the Southern District of Texas found that a
private security firm hired by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to detain aliens for a short term was a state actor for the
purposes of liability in a Bivens action.44 The court held specifi-
cally that immigration and detention were exclusive government
functions.45
41. Compare Watkins v. Roche, 560 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (finding that a phy-
sician who determined that a patient needed to stay for further evaluation and a physician
who treated the patient were state actors because the state, through regulation, had so im-
mersed itself in the process that the physicians were in effect working for the state) with
Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (dismissing, for lack of state action, a
civil rights complaint against the physician who signed the certificate authorizing the initial
transportation of the patient to a state facility).
42. "This power of detention is the type of power normally and historically exercised
by sovereign states and other government entities. [The statutes] confer upon a physician
the power to do something which he otherwise would not have the right to do as an individ-
ual." Kay v. Benson, 472 F. Supp. 851, 851 (D. N.H. 1979).
Another court agreed:
The defendants do not challenge, nor is there a real issue that, when physicians and
hospitals confine persons pursuant to a mental commitment statute, they are exercising
the power of detention delegated to them by the state. Because this power is one his-
torically exercised by the government, the acts of the physicians and hospitals in this
connection constitute state action.
Brown v. Jensen, 572 F. Supp. 193 (D. Colo. 1983) (citations omitted).
43. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
44. A Bivens action is a lawsuit against a federal official alleging that the defendant's
act has deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. It is, in
essence, the federal actor counterpart of a § 1983 action, and, consequently, the requirement
of state action is identical. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
45. As the Medina court stated:
This case implicated two spheres of power: immigration and detention. As this court
1987] SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
For many years, the states have used private sources to pro-
vide services, other than those related to detention, for correctional
institutions. Most commonly, state prison administrators contract
with physicians to provide medical care for prison inmates. This
contracting gives rise to prisoners' claims against private physi-
cians for eighth amendment violations. The inmates claim that by
providing inadequate care, the physicians have subjected the pris-
oners to cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has
adopted, as the standard of care in these medical cases, whether
the provider has been deliberately indifferent to the inmates' seri-
ous medical needs.46
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has, on several occa-
sions, found that the conduct of these private physicians amounts
to state action because the physicians perform the state's constitu-
tionally mandated function of providing for the physical health of
the inmates.47 Indeed, a district court has analogized this finding of
state action in the eighth and fourteenth amendment context to
the fourteenth amendment rights of involuntarily committed
mental patients, and thereby found that the private physicians
who provide medical care to committed mental patients perform a
state function.48
found above, immigration, which includes "the power to expel or exclude aliens," is a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised exclusively by the legislative and executive
branches of the United States Government. Therefore, this court finds state action be-
cause Congress dictated and compelled action on the part of the INS and the carrier.
Likewise, detention is a power reserved to the government, and is an exclusive
prerogative of the state. As the Supreme Court stated,
While as a factual matter any person with sufficient physical power may de-
prive a person of his [life, liberty or] property, only a state or private person
whose action "may be fairly treated as that of the State itself," may deprive him
of "an interest encompassed within the [Fifth or] Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
tection," ....
589 F. Supp. at 1038 (citations omitted).
46. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (establishing the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard). Gamble involved a state-employed physician rather than an independent
contractor.
Pretrial detainees' right to adequate medical care arises under the due process clause,
rather than the eighth amendment. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463
U.S. 239 (1983). The standard of care in due process cases is, arguably, higher than the
standard of care in eighth amendment cases. The analysis of state action, however, would be
identical under the two amendments.
47. See, e.g., Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (11th Cir. 1986); Ancata v. Prison
Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985); Morrison v. Washington County, Ala., 700
F.2d 678 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
48. Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center for Mental Retardation, Inc., 556 F.
Supp. 677, 678 (D. Mass. 1983) ("The critical factor in our decision is the duty of the state
to provide adequate medical services to those whose personal freedom is restricted because
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has reached the opposite
result when examining the conduct of a private doctor in a prison
setting. In Calvert v. Sharp49 the court held that the doctor did
not perform a public function because, historically, the state had
allowed sick prisoners to seek medical attention at private facilities
if the prison facilities were inadequate.50 The prisoner, the pris-
oner's family, prison funds, or the incarcerating county, city, or
town would then pay for the prisoner's private medical care. The
court thus completely ignored the possibility that a state function
may arise by operation of the Constitution as well as by operation
of state statute. The Fourth Circuit's analysis also ignored the is-
sue of ultimate responsibility. Because the prisoner has a constitu-
tional right to adequate health care,5 the state must retain ulti-
mate responsibility for providing the care. If the community or the
family fails to provide for inmates' medical needs, that responsibil-
ity necessarily and ultimately must fall upon the state.
In addition, the Calvert court based its finding of no state ac-
tion on the nature of the doctor's relationship with his patient.
The court found that this relationship was analogous to the public
defender's relationship with her client in Polk County v. Dodson.52
The doctor's affiliation, like the public defender's, was weighted
more heavily toward his patient than toward the state.53 The pri-
vately contracted doctor distinguished himself from the state em-
ployed physician in Estelle v. Gamble5 4 because the former had no
supervisory or custodial functions. 5
they reside in state institutions.").
49. 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 864.
51. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; see also City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244.
52. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
53. 748 F.2d at 863. Arguably, this comparison is ill-considered. The crux of the attor-
ney's unilateral affiliation with her client arose because of the adversary nature of the judi-
cial process. The state pays the public defender to oppose the state in court. This particu-
larized advocacy function is the distinguishing feature of the public defender's employment.
While it is true that a doctor, like a lawyer, has ultimate responsibility only to the client
(patient) and not to an administrative superior, these professionals are not hired specifically
to oppose their employers or the agency paying them under a service contract. The private
doctor's position is more analogous to that of a prison ombudsman: a lawyer hired by the
state to assist inmates with their legal problems, but not to represent the client in actions
against the state.
54. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
55. Another court has reached the same conclusion as Calvert using a slightly different
rationale. The United States District Court for Vermont held that the language of Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. 922 (1982), requires not only that the person be a state actor,
deemed so by virtue of performing a state function, but that the conduct have its source in
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The Fourth Circuit, in a more recent opinion, has left open the
question whether Calvert's analysis might also apply to a state em-
ployed physician.58 While Calvert clearly grounded its holding, at
least in part, on Maryland's historical record of providing medical
services to prisoners, courts construing Calvert have relied more
heavily on the nature of the relationship between the patient and
the doctor.5 Such limited reasoning is specious, however, since it
only becomes necessary to consider this relationship once the court
has decided that, in other respects, the private actor is performing
a public function. The special relationship between these profes-
sionals and their patients and clients can be considered only as an
exception to the generalized rules regarding the relationship be-
tween private actors and state action.
Nothing in the Calvert decision or its progeny suggests any
retreat from the uniformly held view that detention is a public
function. Even Calvert quickly disclaimed any possibility that a
private doctor performing custodial duties could avoid liability
under Section 1983.
Calvert, however, does raise questions about whether a court
would consider a private company engaged in the many facets of
prison administration to be the equivalent of the state in each of
these facets. Traditionally, "public function" analysis has looked at
state law. The court, quoting from Lugar, stated:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
state is responsible. . . . Second the party charged with the deprivation must be a per-
son who may fairly be said to be a state actor.
Nash v. Wennar, 645 F. Supp. 238, 241 (D. Vt. 1986), quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. In
order to meet the first prong of the test, the district court held that the doctor must be
acting in conformity with state regulations, be performing custodial or administrative ac-
tions, or be encouraged by the state to perform the action that is the basis of the lawsuit.
Nash, 645 F. Supp. at 241-42.
Although the language of Lugar might suggest such a two-part analysis, the decisions in
Blum and Rendell-Baker do not utilize the first prong. Possibly, the first prong is necessary
only in joint participation cases in which the actor becomes vested with state power only on
two conditions: use of state law and overt participation of state officials.
56. The court stated:
The District Court found that although Dr. Kapil was employed full-time by the state,
he had no supervisory or custodial duties regarding inmates and he made his medical
decisions based on his own medical judgment. On these facts, the district court con-
cluded that Dr. Kapil did not act under color of state law and dismissed the complaint
on that basis. . . . We find that even if Dr. Kapil were acting under color of state law,
a question we do not decide, Jones has not shown that Dr. Kapil was deliberately indif-
ferent to his serious medical needs.
Jones v. Kapil, 803 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1986).
57. See Nash, 645 F. Supp. at 241-42.
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the principal role of the actor to determine whether the private
party performs a public function. If the private actor was found to
perform a public function, the court could then treat the actor as
the state for purposes of all constitutional litigation-regardless
whether the claimed constitutional deprivation related to the pub-
lic function. For instance, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,5s a dis-
charged teacher sued the school principal for dismissing her with-
out a hearing and for unconstitutional reasons. The claim did not
relate to the purported public function of education. Nonetheless,
the Court resolved the issue by finding that education did not con-
stitute a traditional and exclusive function of the state. Certainly,
if the challenged activity's lack of relation to the public function
were conclusive, the Court could have disposed of the claim more
easily. The Court's failure to disclaim the necessity of a connection
between the state function and the challenged conduct certainly
indicates that the connection is not dispositive of the issue.
The Calvert court's analysis suggests, alternatively, that one
might separate the various functions that a private corrections firm
would perform and then categorize the firm as a state actor only
when it is performing those functions that the state traditionally
has performed .5 Aspects of correctional management such as food
services, janitorial work, and construction might fall into the same
category that the Fourth Circuit places medical care. 0 In contrast,
activities that relate closely to the state's exclusive role in custody
and administration of prisons would constitute public functions.
The Eleventh Circuit, which has found the provision of medi-
cal care to prisoners to be a public function,6 has relied on the
state's specific constitutional responsibility in the area of medical
care rather than on the generalized function of detention. 2 The
opinions do not determine clearly the public function status of
other aspects of correctional management. Courts will have to as-
sess whether public function analysis should continue to look at
the totality of the private contractor's role and make every action a
58. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
59. Although the Fourth Circuit relies principally on statutes to find that medical care
of prisoners has not been historically the exclusive and traditional function of the state,
other courts have relied on the Constitution to find sources for state responsibilities. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. Obviously, the uniqueness of the relationship between doctor and patient man-
dated the result in Calvert. Other factors might affect which, if any, of these other functions
would similarly be exempted from state function treatment.
61. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
[Vol. 40:867880
1987] SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 881
potential source of constitutional liability63 or examine each indi-
vidual aspect of the contractor's work and determine, piecemeal,
whether each piece is quintessentially a state function. 4
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITIES AVAILAMLE TO
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
Even when state action analysis subjects a private actor to po-
tential liability under Section 1983, the defendant might raise one
of several immunity defenses.
A. The Eleventh Amendment
Courts have held that the eleventh amendment bars citizens
from federal court suits against their own state or another state.
Absent the state's waiver of immunity or a congressional abroga-
tion of immunity, 3 citizens cannot name the state as a defendant
63. In Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), the district court seemed
to view detention as the single basis for all correctional activities. The court did not differ-
entiate between any of the various specific activities in which the detaining authority was
engaged. The court did not necessarily need to reach this issue under the facts of the partic-
ular case, however, because the detainees were challenging the overall conditions of their
confinement.
If courts were to separate the detaining authority's various functions, it would compli-
cate significantly "conditions of confinement" lawsuits, in which courts have utilized the
"totality of conditions" analysis. Under the eighth amendment, courts look to the entirety of
the conditions of confinement to determine whether, examined together, they violate consti-
tutional minima. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Were courts to determine
that § 1983 subjects the private contractor to suit only in regard to some aspects of correc-
tional management, inmate plaintiffs might be forced to separate their causes of action and
try some claims as state tort claims and others as federal constitutional claims. This bifurca-
tion might make it impossible for any one court to review the totality of conditions of
confinement.
64. One interesting question might be how courts will view the rights of employees vis-
a-vis the company. Under the totality approach, employees will have constitutional rights as
against the employer, e.g., the right to due process hearings prior to termination and the
right not to be discharged for exercising their constitutional rights. Conversely, under a
piecemeal approach, courts will have to decide whether employment is simply another func-
tion that a court must analyze separately, similar to food services or construction, or
whether employment relates to the specific function that the employee is performing. Under
this approach, employees working at the same facility but performing different functions
might possess different rights against their common employer.
65. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Haderman, 465 U.S. 88 (1984). Sovereign
immunity may be abrogated only by congressional action that explicitly subjects the states
to suit in federal court. Such explicit authorization has been found in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Although the
authorization for such abrogation is found in § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the same
section under which § 1983 was legislated, the Supreme Court expressly has held that § 1983
does not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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in federal court.6 Since the state can act only by its agents or em-
ployees, this immunity is extended to high ranking, policy-making
officials who are in substance acting as the state. Citizens, however,
may sue these high-ranking, state policymaking officials to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of their actions, even though a suit
against a staff official is, in substance, a suit against the state.
When a public official acts unconstitutionally, he or she loses the
shield of sovereign immunity and becomes susceptible to suit. 7
While subject to suit, the state official, however, may be liable only
for prospective injunctive relief. 8 Because the eleventh amend-
ment speaks only of the state, lower ranking officials who do not
personify the state for purposes of litigation cannot invoke the de-
fense of sovereign immunity.
The eleventh amendment, by its very terms, protects only the
state and those officials whose actions are considered to be the
state's actions. Despite the fact that municipal governments exist
only by operation of state law and exercise only the authority that
the state delegates to them, municipal governments are not pro-
tected by eleventh amendment sovereign immunity. Therefore,
Section 1983 allows citizens to sue local governments. 9
A private company that manages a prison or prison system
also could not assert the eleventh amendment defense.7 Unlike
the state, whose responsibility it undertakes, the corporation itself,
and not just its individual employees, could be held liable in a Sec-
tion 1983 action. The relief available against a private prison man-
ager could include monetary damages as well as injunctive relief.
In addition, nothing would bar a plaintiff from raising pendant
state law claims against either the corporation managing the prison
or the corporation's employees in conjunction with the underlying
constitutional claim. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
66. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). Whether, and under what conditions, the
state or its agents may be sued in state court is a legislative determination made by the
state. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
67. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
68. See Edelman, 415 U.S. 651; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
69. See Monnell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
70. Generally, firms contracting with governmental entities are able to share the gov-
ernment's immunity in tort actions for incidental injuries necessarily caused by the con-
tracted work. Negligent and intentional torts generally have been excluded from this form
of immunity. See generally Annot., Right of Contractor with Federal, State, or Local Public
Body to Latter's Immunity from Tort Liability, 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966). This shared immu-
nity necessarily would not apply to constitutional claims because even sovereign officials
shed immunity when violating the Constitution. The shared immunity, however, might af-
fect the contractor's liability for pendant tort claims.
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Halderman7 1 the Supreme Court stated that the eleventh amend-
ment barred state law claims against a state or a high-ranking,
policymaking state official. Because a plaintiff could not raise state
law claims in the absence of the jurisdictional constitutional claim,
the constitutional claim could not be used to bootstrap state law
claims that otherwise would be barred by the eleventh amendment.
The doctrine of Ex Parte Young,72 allowing state policymakers to
be sued when they violate the Constitution, would not be extended
to any pendant claims. 73 The Pennhurst decision, however, obvi-
ously would have no bearing on the prison contracting firm or its
employees. Because they are not protected by the eleventh amend-
ment, they would be subject to pendant state law tort claims or
claims arising from violation of a state statute as part of their ex-
posure in Section 1983 suits. 74
B. Qualified Immunity
In addition to the defense of sovereign immunity available to
the state and its policy-making officials, individual state executive
officials may rely on a defense of qualified immunity. Unless the
official violated a law that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct, a court cannot hold the official liable for
money damages.75 The rationale behind this defense includes both
the need of public officials to carry out their public charge without
fear of personal monetary liability and to give them known, clear
standards by which they may govern their conduct.76
71. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
72. 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73. The Court held:
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as Greene v. Louisville & Inter-
urban, R. R. Co., neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may
override the Eleventh Amendment. A federal court must examine each claim in a case
to see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
We concluded above that a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out
their official responsibilities is a claim against the state that is protected by the Elev-
enth Amendment. We now hold that the principle applies as well to state law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 (citations omitted).
74. Obviously, however, liability for these claims in state court might be affected by a
state's grant of immunity to the firm on the state law claims.
75. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Although Harlow involved a claim
against a federal official, the qualified immunity accorded state officials in § 1983 actions is
decided on the identical standard. Id. at 818 n.30.
76. The Harlow court noted:
Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude today that bare
allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the
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Traditionally, qualified or absolute immunity has been ac-
corded only to public officials. The majority opinion in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil, however, suggests one exception to this tradi-
tion." Justice Powell's dissent in Lugar disagreed with the policy
of allowing a debtor to obtain money damages pursuant to a Sec-
tion 1983 action against a creditor who simply relied on a state
statute and enlisted the assistance of state officials to collect a just
debt. The majority opinion responded to Justice Powell's dissent
with the suggestion that an immunity defense, somewhat akin to
qualified immunity, could possibly protect creditors in this
situation. 8
Two circuit courts have acted on the Supreme Court's sugges-
tion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a form of
immunity for creditors who rely on presumptively valid attach-
ment statutes. 7 The court based its decision partly on the same
policy consideration that guided the Supreme Court: it would be
unfair to allow a damages action against a creditor who relied on
an attachment statute that he or she had no reason to know was
unconstitutional. In addition, the court considered the historical
basis for such an immunity defense. In so doing, the court relied
implicitly on the test expressed in Owen v. City of Independence"
for determining whether any immunity is available in Section 1983
actions. Owen held that immunities that existed in 1871, the year
in which Section 1983 was enacted, are incorporated into Section
costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from li-
ability for civil damages insofar a their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by
reference to clearly established law .... should avoid excessive disruption of govern-
ment and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18 (citations omitted).
77. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
78. The Lugar majority stated:
JUSTICE POWELL is concerned that private individuals who innocently make use of
seemingly valid state laws would be responsible, if the law is subsequently held to be
unconstitutional, for the consequences of their actions. In our view, however, this prob-
lem should be dealt with not by changing the character of the cause of action but by
establishing an affirmative defense. A similar concern is at least partially responsible
for the availability of a good-faith defense, or qualified immunity, to state officials. We
need not reach the question of the availability of such a defense to private individuals
at this juncture.
Id. at 942 n.23.
79. Folsom Inv. Co., Inc. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982).
80. 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980).
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1983 jurisprudence if "the tradition of immunity was so fairly
rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong policy
reasons that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish the doctrine.' "81 When the Fifth Circuit applied
this analysis it found that in 1871 a debtor whose property was
attached could bring an action for malicious prosecution or mali-
cious attachment against the creditor. In that action, the creditor
had an absolute defense if he had acted in good faith. From this
history, the court inferred that Congress must have assumed in
1871 that creditors who relied on presumptively valid attachment
statutes would not be subject to liability so long as they had no
reason to know that the law was unconstitutional.8 2
In adopting this new species of immunity, the Fifth Circuit
incorporated the test from Harlow v. Fitzgerald3 by holding that a
creditor would receive immunity if it were not clearly established
at the time of attachment that the attachment law was unconstitu-
tional.8 4 The court made clear, however, that this form of immu-
nity was different from traditional qualified immunity and that the
contours of this rule might very well develop differently from those
of the traditional Harlow rule. 5
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has adopted a test for qualified immunity for private actors with-
out expressly limiting the coverage to creditors. In the context of a
challenge to an attachment proceeding, the court allowed the pri-
vate defendant to assert the defense of qualified immunity rather
than create a new type of immunity limited to the attachment sit-
uation .8 The rule of law the Eighth Circuit adopted refers to pri-
vate parties rather than to creditors. The court's reasoning, how-
ever, is situationally specific. In reviewing the history of immunity
in this type of case, the court looked to the causes of action for
malicious attachment and malicious prosecution, and in discussing
the policy underlying its holding, relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Lugar relating only to attachment situations.8 7
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals itself has not had the
opportunity to decide explicitly whether this new form of qualified
81. Id.
82. Folsom Inv. Co., 681 F.2d at 1038.
83. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
84. Folsom Inv. Co., 681 F.2d at 1037.
85. Id. at 1036-38.
86. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 850-52.
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immunity will attach to all private parties or only to some subcat-
egory of defendants including, at the very least, creditors who in-
voke presumptively valid attachment statutes.8 A district court in
the Eighth Circuit, however, has extended the doctrine to a non-
attachment situation.89 In that case, the plaintiff sued the state li-
censed detoxification center to which he had been transferred sub-
sequent to his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The court found
that the policies underlying qualified immunity dictated that the
court should extend immunity to the detoxification center in this
situation.90
If courts extend qualified immunity to employees of private
corrections firms, the issue of whether the corporation itself is enti-
tled to that immunity will remain. In Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence91 the Supreme Court held that municipal corporations,
which exist only by operation of state law and which can perform
only those functions delegated to them by the state, are not enti-
tled to raise the defense of qualified immunity. The Court relied
on the law in effect in 1871, which indicated that Congress did not
intend to immunize municipal governments. Notwithstanding
88. In Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co. v. Ulery, 787 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir.
1986), the court declined to extend the rule of Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985),
allowing immediate appealability for a denial of qualified immunity to private parties. The
decision does not indicate whether the issue in the case was related to attachment.
89. Carman v. City of Eden Prairie, 622 F. Supp. 963 (D. Minn. 1985).
90. Id. at 965-66. "Qualified immunity may be extended to private parties under cer-
tain circumstances. . . . The same public interest policies discussed in Buller persuade the
court that Fairview should be entitled to raise the qualified immunity defense in this situa-
tion." Id.
The opinion ignores, however, the historical roots of the immunity defense as discussed
by the Eighth Circuit. Those roots are applicable only to the defense in a challenge to an
attachment proceeding. The Supreme Court has indicated that a defense of immunity will
pertain only to § 1983 cases when it is clear from history that the defense was commonly
used in 1871. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
Carman, apparently, is the only case to extend the doctrine of qualified immunity for
private parties beyond the realm of challenges to attachment proceedings. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has rejected, without explanation, the extension of the defense of qualified immunity to
any private parties. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983) (landlord
utilized assistance of police in evicting a tenant). The Eleventh Circuit has declined explic-
itly to reach the issue at this time. The court stated:
Because of our disposition of this issue, we do not express any opinion on the question
of whether in a § 1983 suit, private actors are entitled to the good-faith defense ac-
corded to state officials. We do note, however, that the Supreme Court expressly re-
served this question in Lugar. . . and that other courts have disagreed about the avail-
ability of such a defense . ...
I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1550 n.ll (11th Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted) (challenge to prejudgment attachment).
91. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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Owen, the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota has
found that nonmunicipal corporations can assert the defense of
qualified immunity.92 The other courts that have granted immu-
nity to private parties in attachment cases have not reached the
question explicitly, although in each case the creditor being sued
was a corporation. It certainly would be an ironic result if a munic-
ipality could contract with a private corrections firm and the cor-
rections firm could assert a defense of qualified immunity unavail-
able to the municipal corporation.9 3
Conversely, one could look to the nature of the contracting
government-state or municipal-to determine whether the firm
would be able to assert a defense of qualified immunity. If the gov-
ernment could assert some form of immunity, then the firm would
be able to claim some form of qualified immunity. Although this
theory is appealing and easily applied, it would encourage firms to
contract with states, at the expense of municipalities.
The policies underlying qualified immunity for state employ-
ees do not necessarily warrant the extension of that doctrine to the
employees of firms engaged in corrections for profit. The doctrine
encourages qualified and devoted people to become involved in
government and to perform their jobs to the best of their ability
without fear of unwarranted litigation. It envisions that state em-
ployees will have the good of the state as their goal. Employees of
a private corrections firm are responsible for making a profit for
the organization. They do not answer to the public at large as do
state employees; rather, they answer to their superiors and, in the
case of corporate employees, to their stockholders. Unlike state
employees, corporate employees may be forced to choose between
making money and safeguarding the rights of inmates. A defense
of qualified immunity, if awarded to these private employees,
might encourage them to cut corners to maximize profits. It has
92. The court found the rationale of Owen inapplicable:
One of the central rationales articulated by the Owen court, however, is that holding
municipalities strictly liable for § 1983 damages would equitably spread the loss among
the public for constitutional violations caused by executing public policies. This ration-
ale is inapplicable when a private entity like Fairview is involved. Moreover, to deny a
private party like Fairview good faith immunity would be unjust when it is required by
state statute to exercise discretion. The failure to provide immunity might also deter
such organizations from providing necessary services to the public.
Carman, 622 F. Supp. at 966 (citations omitted).
93. Conversely, when the private corporation contracts with the state, it subjects itself
to liability that the state itself never faced because the state is protected by sovereign im-
munity. In that situation, granting qualified immunity to the corporation would not subject
it to less liability than the state.
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been suggested that a failure to provide the defense might deter
good private individuals from providing services to the public.9 4
This analysis would not be complete, however, without looking at
whether a private actor is required to accept public responsibility,
as a state is, or volunteers to enter the arena.
The situation of the employee of the private corrections com-
pany is categorically different from the private creditor, who has
been clothed with immunity by two federal circuits. The creditor is
using a state statute to recover a just debt. He has no choice but to
use the statute if he wishes to recover the property. The private
corrections firm, conversely, voluntarily has entered a field previ-
ously within the exclusive province of the state for the purpose of
making a profit. It has accepted the responsibility for ensuring that
the prisoners' constitutional rights are protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although Section 1983 will continue to be a via-
ble remedy for prisoners seeking to challenge the constitutionality
of a private corrections provider's practices, the nature of the liti-
gation certainly will reflect the change in governance of the prison
system. Most likely, private corrections firms will be considered
"state actors" and thus subject to liability under Section 1983. The
need to make the state action determination, however, will add a
new layer of litigation to the Section 1983 lawsuit. In addition, the
liability of private contractors may be greater than that for public
employees in comparable situations since the private party will be
able to assert fewer immunity defenses.
94. Carman, 662 F. Supp. at 966.
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